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América Latina ha estado marcada por explosiones de crecimiento que, en su mayoría, han terminado 
en crisis y largos períodos de estancamiento, lo que durante la mayor parte del siglo pasado se tradujo 
en un desempeño económico débil. Este artículo revisa la experiencia de crecimiento de los países 
latinoamericanos, con énfasis en algunas áreas específicas que ayudan a explicar por qué a  la región 
le ha costado tanto lograr un crecimiento sostenido. En particular, analiza el rol de la apertura 
internacional y el comercio intrarregional, de las instituciones, de la estabilidad macroeconómica y de 
la distribución de la riqueza a la hora de conseguir el despegue económico y un crecimiento sostenido. 
También revisa temas más generales relacionados con el crecimiento, tales como la importancia de 
proteger el derecho de propiedad y contar con una estructura adecuada de premio al esfuerzo y 






Latin America has been dominated by growth expansions that, more often than not, have ended in 
crises and protracted periods of stagnation.  This has led to poor growth performance during most of 
the past century.  This paper reviews Latin American growth experiences and discusses some 
particular areas that help to explain why sustainable growth has been so elusive in the region.  In 
particular, it discusses the role of openness and intraregional trade, the role of institutions, 
macroeconomic stability and inequality, all factors that are central to resume and maintain growth.  
The paper also discusses more general issues related to growth, such as the importance of protecting 
property rights and having an adequate structure of rewards to effort, which includes equal 
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Certainly, Latin America is one of the regions with more disappointing results during the 
twentieth century.  There have been many outbursts of growth, but they have usually ended 
up in a crisis and a long period of slow growth. The 1960s and 70s—particularly the 
former—are remembered as periods of high growth, but in those days Latin American 
growth was slower than in the world at large and in many other regions (table 1). Perhaps 
the most important feature of the 1960s was that growth variability across countries in the 
region was very low. In contrast, during the 1990s, with the world growing much less, 
some economies managed to grow strongly, at much higher rates than the rest of the world. 
But a number of those countries came to a sharp stop. Few have been able to cope with 
scarce capital inflows and an unstable international environment for emerging markets. 
More recently, the external atmosphere has been positive for emerging markets, but the 
issue in many Latin American countries (LAC) is how to resume, or in many cases start, a 
process of sustained growth.  
This paper revisits some of the main issues regarding economic growth in Latin 
America.  I begin in sections 2 and 3 with a review of growth performance and the 
explanations for these facts based on cross-country econometric evidence.  Then, in section 
4, I focus on the role of openness and the low regional trade among Latin American 
economies, which certainly reveal a weakness to sustain growth. In section 5, I discuss 
briefly how to mitigate crises, a recurrent phenomenon in the region that has been a 
fundamental cause of low growth. Then, in section 6, I tackle one of the most difficult 
problems in the region, namely severe inequality, and discuss how it can affect the quality 
of public policy. I discuss more general issues regarding fundamental factors that spur 
growth in section 7.  The paper concludes in section 8 with some final remarks on the 
current economic outlook for Latin America.  
 
   2
2.  Growth Performance and Income Gaps 
 
The growth performance of a number of LAC since 1960 has been volatile and modest (see 
Table 1.
1)  Volatility was particularly high toward the end of the century.  In contrast, the 
1960s are usually remembered as a period of high and stable growth.  Even the 1970s look 
reasonably dynamic despite the oil shock.  However, as the table shows, the 1960s were 
also years of strong growth all around the world.  For this reason, a better assessment can 
be made by looking into the income gap between Latin America and the developed world.  
This allows us to see whether the region has been indeed catching up with advanced 
economies. 
  A long-term view, using Maddison (2001) data, is presented in Figure 1, where 
Latin American per-capita GDP is compared to that of the US and that of the advanced 
economies.  Panel (a) shows the simple average of per-capita GDP, while panel (b) weights 
by GDP of each country.  Alternatively, the weights could have been based on population, 
but the figure looks the same.  Latin America grew mildly with respect to the US in the first 
40 years of the twentieth century.  Latin America did not grow during the Great 
Depression, but the decline was somewhat milder.  In contrast, the second half of the 
century Latin America steadily lost ground with respect to the advanced world.  During the 
1940s each Latin American country sharply narrowed its gap with respect to the US and 
then broadened it due, to a large extent, to abrupt changes in output in the developed world.  
The evolution of the output gap with respect to the US for single countries during 
the twentieth century is presented in Table 2.  Argentina and Uruguay were relatively high-
income countries, and to a lower extent, Chile.  Post 1950 decline is shared by almost all of 
the countries, with the exception of Mexico and, most importantly, Brazil, which grew fast 
during the Brazilian “miracle” of the 1960s and 70s.  Indeed, Brazil is the only country 
among those in the table whose gap with respect to the US was smaller in 2000 than in 
1970.  The decline was sharper during the 1980s, the so-called lost decade. As already 
shown in Table 1, growth was not the highest during the 1990s, there was greater stability, 
                                                 
1 For tables 1 and 2 the sample consists of 21 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.  These tables compare with a set of East 
Asian countries that are those listed in Table 1.   3
although a decline took place the last years of the century.  Looking across decades, the two 
most important periods and countries catching up with the USA were Brazil in the 1970s 
and Chile in the 1990s.
2 
Having shown some basic facts for the output gap between Latin American and 
developed economies, it is possible to decompose this gap in a similar way to traditional 
growth decompositions.  Traditional growth decompositions compute the relative 
contribution of productive factor accumulation and total factor productivity to economic 
growth.  But, in this case, I decompose the output gap into a factor and productivity gaps, 
which is more consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical growth model, since it 
explains income differentials rather than growth differentials.  In this decomposition I 
explicitly consider human capital. This becomes relevant because comparing levels of 
income is important in controlling for differences in the quality of the labor force across 
countries. I compare the income per capita of some LAC and other regions with that of the 
United States, as is usually done in the literature, and then decompose the difference 
between them into a productivity gap, a capital-output ratio gap, and a human capital gap. I 
follow the decomposition suggested by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and 
Jones (1999). 





1-α.   (1) 
 
where A is total factor productivity (TFP), K  is physical capital, and H is labor adjusted for 
human capital. The last of these can be rewritten as Lh, where L is employment and h is a 
measure of human capital per worker. Using lowercase letters for per-capita (or, more 





1-α.    (2) 
 
Now we can compare the levels of income per capita of two countries, j and i, as 
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We could simply use this decomposition, but, as we know from growth theory, if a 
productivity shock hits (that is, if A rises), it will lead to an increase in the capital-labor 
ratio in the steady state, and therefore the increase in productivity will be wrongly 
attributed to an increase in the capital-labor ratio. However, what remains invariant to a 
productivity increase in the steady state is the capital-output ratio, which depends on the 
investment rate, which in turn depends on the saving rate. Therefore, an increase in 
investment will lead to an increase in the capital-output ratio, but an increase in 
productivity will not.
3  
Rewriting equation (2) in terms of the capital-output ratio—that is, dividing and 
multiplying the right-hand side by y


















Finally, we can consider two countries and decompose the output gap between them as 
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The comparisons here are done with respect to the United States (country i). Therefore, if 
output per capita turns out to be Z percent of that of the United States, Za percent can be 
explained by productivity differentials, measured as the first term on the right-hand side of 
equation (5), Zky percent by differences in the capital-output ratio, and Zh percent by 
differences in human capital. By construction, then, (1 + Z) = (1 + Za)(1 + Zky)(1 + Zh).
4 
                                                 
3 For further justification, see Cole et al. (2005).  For a skeptical view of this approach, see Bosworth and 
Collins (2003), who argue that not all increases in the capital-labor ratio are the result of increases in TFP. 
4 The decompositions are constructed on a country-by-country basis, so if averages are taken across countries, 
this identity may not hold.   5
Finally, to measure human capital I use the traditional specification based on the 
returns to education per year of schooling: 
 
h = e
φE,  (6) 
 
where  E represents years of education and φ the returns on schooling, which can be 
estimated using Mincer equations.
5  Following Hall and Jones (1999), the exponent in 
equation (6) is assumed to be piecewise linear. For the first four years of schooling I use a 
return of 13.4 percent, which is the return to education in Africa. For the next four years I 
use a return of 10.1 percent, and for years beyond I use the return on schooling in OECD 
countries, which is 6.8 percent. 
The rest of the data are constructed in the same way as for the Solow decomposition 
discussed previously. For the national accounts I use the Penn World Tables version 6.1 
from Heston, Summers and Atten (2002), in order to have internationally comparable data. 
The results are presented in table 3.  Latin America’s per-capita GDP was only 21 percent 
that of the United States when measured at purchasing power parity (PPP).
6 The capital-
output ratio in Latin America was only 27 percent lower than that in the United States, and 
human capital was 42 percent lower. The largest difference appeared for TFP, which was 
57 percent lower than that of the United States. Therefore, the most important factor 
explaining the differences with the United States is TFP, followed by human capital.
7  
Indeed, should the TFP gap close, the output gap would be 42 percent.  In contrast, closing 
the capital-output ratio gap would increase the regional income with respect to the US from 
21 percent to 25 percent.  
For all countries in the table, the most important gap is the TFP gap.  Chile and 
Mexico are the countries where this gap is the narrowest within Latin America, and is 
similar to that of human capital.  It is also important to recall that the human capital gap is 
not corrected by quality and, as was mentioned before, there is strong evidence that quality 
                                                 
5 We have (1/h)(dh/dE) = φ, which is the return to schooling.  
6 It is a simple average of Latin American countries for which there were available data in 2000. 
7 The data on human capital are based exclusively on measures of the educational attainment of the labor 
force and are not adjusted for quality. This is the implicit assumption when using the same return for 
education across countries. As will be discussed later, there is evidence of low relative quality of education in 
Chile, which would increase the human capital gap.   6
of education in the region is relatively poor, which may indicate that the human capital gap 
in table 3 could be underestimated.  The countries from other regions in the table also show 
that the largest gap is the one on TFP.   This feature is common around the world with only 
a few exceptions (Parente and Prescott, 2002). 
Hence, the largest gains in terms of closing the income gap may be obtained by 
closing the productivity gap, that is, by increasing efficiency in the use of existing factors 
of production, in order to produce more with the same inputs. The table also shows that the 
Asian “miracle” has been more the result of capital deepening than of productivity 
enhancement, a point originally raised by Young (1995).  
 
3.  A Review of Empirical Evidence on Growth Determinants 
 
A huge amount of research has been done in the last 15 years attempting to determine the 
main factors that underlie economic growth.  In this section, I summarize some of the 
findings of De Gregorio and Lee (2004).  In a five-year panel data covering from 1970 to 
2000, per-capita growth (GROWTH) is regressed on a number of variables.  The regression 
controls for initial per-capita GDP in each period (Y0) in order to take into account 
conditional convergence.  The regression also includes the investment (I) and fertility rates 
(F).  The neoclassical growth model predicts that high savings (foreign and domestic) speed 
up the transition and lead to a higher level of steady-state income.  In contrast, a high rate 
of population growth leads to a lower level of steady-state income. 
Not only the quantity, but also the quality of resources matters, and to control for 
the quality of human resources the explanatory variables include the average years of 
schooling for males aged 25 and over (SCH), available from Barro and Lee (2001), and life 
expectancy at birth (LIFE).  The latter variable is considered another important component 
of human capital stock.  A longer life expectancy would tend to indicate a healthier, more 
productive labor force.  As explained before, there are not enough data on quality of 
education to correct the measures of educational quality.  However, the existing scattered 
evidence does indeed show that education is pretty mediocre in Latin America.  A number 
of institutional and policy variables were included, and they are quite standard.  They are: 
government expenditure (G), rule of law (RL), inflation (INF), and openness (OPE)     7
Finally, a dummy variable to measure whether or not a country experienced a 
currency crisis in a five-year period was included (CRISIS) and, in order to control for the 
external environment, the growth rate of the terms of trade (TOT) was used.  The results of 
this regression are shown below
8: 
 
Growth = - 0.023 Log(Y0) + 0.0442 I – 0.0157 Log(F) + 0.0020 SCH + 0.0686 Log(LIFE) 
    (0.0036)  (0.0283)       (0.0061)             (0.0018)         (0.0222) 
 
- 0.0651 G + 0.0158 RL – 0.0157 INF + 0.0092 OP + 0.0287 TOT 
   (0.0250)    (0.0077)  (0.0100)       (0.0044)         (0.024) 
 
    - 0.0176 CRISIS        No. of countries: 85, obs: 464. 
        (0.00056) 
 
  The results are quite standard, although it is important to note some particularities.  
As usual, after controlling for factors determining long-run income, conditional 
convergence is obtained.  Inflation, one of the most recurrent economic problems in Latin 
America, loses some significance when the currency crisis variable is included.  The reason 
is the colinearity between currency crisis and inflation, this is, currency crisis happens also 
in countries that have, during the five-year period, high inflation.  However, it is not 
possible to establish causality between crisis and inflation, and most likely both are 
determined jointly by bad macroeconomic management. 
In a recent paper, Rodríguez (2006) argues that cross-country regressions are not 
robust when taking into account all possible interactions among explanatory variables, and 
any result could be obtained.  This view would apply to almost all empirical work using 
                                                 
8 The system has six equations, corresponding to the periods 1970-75, 1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90, 
1990-95, and 1995-2000. The dependent variables are the growth rates of per capita GDP. Data on GDP are 
from Penn-World Tables version 6.1. The log of per capita GDP, the average years of male secondary and 
higher schooling, and the log of life expectancy at age one are measured at the beginning of each period.  The 
ratios of government consumption and investment to GDP, the inflation rate, the total fertility rate and the 
growth rate of the terms of trade are period averages. The rule-of-law index is the earliest value available (for 
1982 or 1985). The openness variable is the period average. Estimation is by three-stage least squares.     
Instruments are the actual values of the variables for schooling, life expectancy, openness, and the terms of 
trade; dummy variables for Spanish or Portuguese colonies and other colonies (which have substantial 
explanatory power for inflation); lagged values of the log of per capita GDP, the government consumption 
ratio, and the investment ratio; and the initial values for each period of the rule-of-law index and democracy 
index.  The instrument for the rule-of-law indicator is its value for 1982 or 1985.  The initial values of foreign 
reserve-import ratio are used as an instrument for balance-of-payments crisis. Individual constants (not 
shown) are included for each period.  Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses.  
For further details and additional estimations, see De Gregorio and Lee (2004).     8
cross-country data.  In addition, there is enough evidence beyond econometrics to confirm 
many results, and the regressions help to quantify the magnitude of the effects.  There is no 
small country that has developed while not being open to trade or having high inflation.  On 
the other hand, although terms of trade are important determinants of economic 
performance, the evidence shows that they have not been a relevant factor in explaining 
why Latin America has grown less than the world or even less than East Asia, if its 
countries are supposed to have experienced the largest increases in terms of trade.   
Econometric results will always lack full robustness, but taking them as indicative, rather 
than as definitive, of broad correlations is very useful. It is also true that, most of the times, 
the effects of some variable depend on the presence of other conditions, but this does not 
imply that some combination of right and wrong policies may work.
9 
Bearing this criticism in mind, the regression presented above is used to compare 
growth performance between LAC and the world average.  It is worth pointing out before 
discussing the results that the benchmark of comparison is the entire world, and one could 
be more interested in comparing the results with regions whose economies have been more 
successful in terms of growth.  That exercise is done in De Gregorio and Lee (2004), where 
the comparison is undertaken with East Asia, in which case there are some differences, in 
particular regarding the role of openness. The results of the comparison with the world are 
presented in Table 4.  The first column presents the difference between actual growth in the 
region and in the world.  The second column shows the predicted difference according to 
the regression and is then decomposed in the rest of the columns into the different 
explanatory factors used in the regression.  The bottom row presents the average rate of 
actual and predicted growth for the world.  Actual growth during 1970-2000 was 2.1 
percent a year, while the predicted yearly rate of growth is 3 percent.  This implies that 
Latin America grew on average 0.9 percent (1.2 percentage points below the world), and 
the prediction is 1.8 percent (1.2 percentage points below the prediction for the world). 
Initial income, due to convergence would have implied more growth for the region, except 
for countries that started above world average: Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.   
                                                                                                                                                     
 
9 In the discussion of Ros (2006), it is argued that even the way to measure openness in this paper, trade 
corrected by size, includes an implicit interaction effect between size and openness, which is the one theory 
would suggest.   9
Investment, fertility and human resources (i.e., schooling and life expectancy) retarded 
growth with respect to the world.  Institutional factors explain an important fraction of the 
lower growth in the region.  High government consumption, weak rule of law, high 
inflation and low degree of openness had a negative impact on growth, and they total 
almost three-quarters of the difference.  This has been particularly important in countries 
with high inflation, such as Argentina and Brazil.  Openness played a less important role; 
however, as discussed below, using the world as a benchmark could be misleading.   
Countries with high instability, measured by the number of currency crises, also suffered 
from slower growth, such as the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.  
The absence of crisis played a positive role only in Colombia. 
In contrast, terms of trade shocks played a small part in explaining the poor growth 
performance of the region. Therefore, the old idea that supported the import-substitution 
strategy in Latin America during the 1960s, which held that opening to trade would result 
in developing countries producing “bad goods”—mostly commodities, whose terms of 
trade would be declining—has been proved wrong. It is true that countries that face 
unfavorable terms of trade grow less rapidly, but it is also true that there has not been such 
a deterioration in the terms of trade in Latin America.
10 
Finally, it is important to note that comparing with the world average could give a 
partial view about the region’s strengths and weaknesses, as the world is not necessarily the 
best control group.  In De Gregorio and Lee (2004), we compare growth performance 
between Latin America and a group of high growth East Asian economies.  That exercise 
revealed that the two most important factors, explaining the 3-percentage-point difference 
in growth performance, are low investment and low openness in the region.  Both account 
separately for 0.6 percentage point of lower growth in Latin America with respect to East 
Asia. 
In the following sections I will discuss with greater detail some of the issues raised 
in the empirical discussion presented in this section.
11 
 
                                                 
10 Meller (2002) provides a clear illustration of this claim for the Chilean case. He says that in 1980 two tons 
of copper where needed to buy one personal computer, while in 2000 one ton could buy 2 personal 
computers.  In 2005 the price of copper was double that of 2000, and in 2006 has risen further. 
11 Loayza et al. (2004) present some additional and detailed empirical evidence on growth in Latin America.   10
 
4.  Openness, Regional Trade and Institutions 
 
As reported in the previous section, openness is good for growth, and here I will discuss 
some issues regarding openness, regional trade, and the interplay with institutions. Most 
empirical research on economic growth has lent support to this finding.  This result enjoys 
broad (but by no means total) consensus. In sum, more-open economies have been able to 
grow faster than closed ones.
12 This is particularly significant in periods of trade 
liberalization. Of course, we can add many caveats to the strategy of opening up, the 
institutional framework in which opening up takes place, etc. etc. However, it is a proven 
fact that more open economies grow faster than closed ones. This lesson is especially valid 
for small economies. I have been unable to find an example of a relatively high-income 
small economy that is not integrated with the rest of the world, or that has managed to grow 
being isolated from the world.  Although openness plays a small role in explaining GDP 
growth of Latin America vis-à-vis the rest of the world, it has been an important factor in 
explaining differences with high growth economies of East Asia (De Gregorio and Lee, 
2004). 
In addition, Winters et al. (2004), in a detailed review of the evidence, find that 
openness is associated with poverty reduction in the long run, and there is a strong 
presumption that this association holds in the short run as well. Of course, trade 
liberalization may also work with other policies to alleviate poverty. Therefore, trade 
liberalization is good for the economy, and it is advisable to undertake it right away. (The 
same cannot be said of other areas, such as financial liberalization.)  
Unilateral trade liberalization has already occurred in most of Latin America and 
more intensely during the 1990s. Indeed, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, i.e. most of Latin America, were 
classified as closed in the period 1970-1989 according to Wacziarg and Welch (2003), and 
as open economies in the period 1990-1999.  
                                                 
12 See also Edwards (1998) and Dollar and Kraay (2002). For a more skeptical view, see Rodríguez and 
Rodrik (2001).   11
Although tariffs have been reduced and non-tariff barriers have been removed, Latin 
America still has small trade coefficients. Most Asian countries have substantially more 
trade than Latin American countries (figure 2). Only China is below three LAC in the 
sample, but after correcting trade by size, China appears to be much more open than Latin 
America. This begs the question of how to increase integration and gain access to new 
markets, given that tariffs and most barriers to trade have been substantially reduced.  In 
some respect, many policymakers may feel frustrated after they liberalize trade, while 
actual trade takes some time to pick up. 
Moreover, intraregional trade in Latin America is scarce when compared with other 
regions of the world (figure 3). It was already scant in the 1960s, at about 10 percent of the 
total, and although it has shown some increase in recent years, it remains comparatively 
low. Trade among South American countries is 24 percent of their total trade, and trade 
among all LAC is 17 percent, the lowest among the regions shown in the figure. The same 
pattern of low integration emerges for other country groupings such as Mercosur or Aladi 
(not shown). These findings stand in sharp contrast to the dynamic intraregional trade 
among the East Asian countries: already in the 1960s, about 26 percent of these countries’ 
trade was with each other, and that number has increased to 50 percent in recent years. 
Trade among the industrialized countries has long been an important share of their total 
trade. 
Institutions play a key role in fostering trade. I use institutions in the definition of 
Douglas North as the formal and informal rules that constrain human economic behavior.  
However, this discussion is more focused on formal rules, for which we can have some 
indicators to measure quality, such as the rule of law, used in section 2, in cross-country 
regressions.  
For countries to develop deep and extensive trade relations, each must demonstrate 
at home the ability to enforce contracts, to maintain the rule of law, and to establish 
enduring trade relations. The existence of a stable macroeconomic environment is also 
important, because it reduces uncertainty among trade participants. Yet Latin America has 
weak institutions and is subject to recurrent macroeconomic crises, and this impedes the 
growth of trade linkages. Recent trade disputes—such as the problems over natural gas 
between Argentina, Bolivia and Chile—bear witness to these obstacles.   12
As shown in section 2, the indicators of institutional quality, such as the rule of law 
index, are correlated with economic growth.  Latin America has weak institutions.   
Additional evidence is presented in figure 4, which shows the index of corruption of 
Transparency International in 2003. The index ranges from 0, the most corrupt, to 10, the 
least so. Latin American countries are depicted with dark lines, and all of them with the 
only exception of Chile, followed by Costa Rica, are in the high-corruption side of the 
distribution. 
The next question is then how to proceed and what do we know about institutional 
building, especially from the standpoint of the discussion on trade fostering.  It seems that 
strong institutions are needed for trade liberalization to be effective in promoting growth.  
This is particularly important in countries rich in natural resources, where the possibility of 
rent seeking and voracity effects is high.  This does not imply that strong institutions are a 
prerequisite for successful trade liberalization, but building strong institutions helps to 
maximize the benefits from reforms.  Indeed, in Rodríguez’s (2006) view of massive 
interactions among growth determinants, perhaps one of the most important candidates is 
the quality of institutions.  For example, privatization works only when it is appropriately 
done and not used as a vehicle to assault the state.  Privatization is unlikely to work in a 
corrupt state.  Indeed, in recent evidence, Prasad et al. (2003) show that only countries with 
strong institutions can benefit from financial liberalization.   
Recent research at the IMF (IMF, 2005) can shed more light on policies that can 
help to improve institutions. Institutions are slow to adjust, and major changes involve 
constitutional and political reforms.  However, there are many examples of countries that 
have gone through institutional transitions during the last 30 years.
13  IMF (2005) reports 
empirical evidence on the determinants of the probability of having an institutional 
transition and on the quality of institutions.  Regarding openness, measured by an index 
that takes a value of 0 prior to liberalization and 1 thereafter, is found to increase the 
probability of having an institutional transition and the quality of institutions.  Hence, 
openness not only has direct effects on growth, but it also helps to strengthen institutions. 
                                                 
13 The definition of institutional transition is based on indices of political score (Polity index) and economic 
freedom score (Cato index) and involve three characteristics: (i) they must result in a minimum level of 
institutional quality, (ii) significant increase in quality, and (iii) they endure.  In Latin America the transitions   13
In the regressions reported in IMF (2005), other variables showed up significant 
determinants of the probability of having an institutional transition and quality of 
institutions.
14  This is the case of accountability and freedom of the press.  High levels of 
education and strong institutions in neighboring countries also increase the probability of 
having a transition, but its effects on the quality of institutions is weak. As expected, 
countries with high income are less likely to have an institutional transition, but their 
institutions are also of better quality.  Foreign aid reduces the probability of having a 
transition, but has little relation with quality.  On the other hand, the greater the dependence 
on natural resources, the weaker the institutions, although the effect on the probability of 
transition is insignificant.  These findings help to explain why some research has found a 
negative effect between economic growth and natural resource abundance. 
Overall, the evidence not only points to the importance of openness on economic 
growth, but also on its impact on the quality of institutions and on the probability of 
improving them.  
 
5.  Macroeconomic Stability and Crisis Prevention 
 
When thinking about Latin American economies, observers would point first to 
macroeconomic instability, such as high inflation, hyperinflation, currency crisis and weak 
fiscal polices.  Moreover, as shown in previous sections, they have been also important 
deterrents of economic growth.  There are many channels through which macroeconomic 
instability hampers growth.  For example, it distorts the allocation of talents, since it 
rewards speculation and instability-protection rather than productivity and innovation. 
Financial markets work less efficiently.  Finally, macroeconomic instability signals 
incompetent policymakers and weak institutional framework. 
Clearly, in the macro front one size does not fit all. The selection of exchange rate 
regime, integration to international financial markets, and other policy choices have not a 
unique answer. However, the recurrent crises in the region provide some general principles. 
                                                                                                                                                     
are: Argentina 1991, Brazil 1999, Chile 1976, Costa Rica 2000, Dominican Republic 1996, Ecuador 2000, El 
Salvador 1994, Guatemala 1994, Honduras 2003, Mexico 1991, Panama 2000, Paraguay 2004, Peru 2003.  
14 In the regressions for quality of institutions this variable is measured with indices of governance, corruption 
and economic freedom.   14
But, before discussing them briefly, I must clarify that, in my view, a crisis is not a purely 
random phenomenon, and good policy can shield countries from crisis and contagion, while 
enjoying the benefits of integration and financial development. Indeed, recent literature, 
particularly after the Asian crisis, has modeled crisis as a self-fulfilling phenomenon, many 
times unrelated to fundamentals. I do not believe this is the case since here are always 
policy distortions, at the macro or financial level. Crises may be triggered by external 
developments, but the economies affected are never entirely innocent, because crises do not 
occur at random. Contagion and frantic financial markets may make a bad situation worse, 
but in the end there is no substitute for sound domestic policy. Therefore, I do not share the 
view that crises can be bad outcomes of otherwise sound economies. Crises happen because 
of mismanagement. 
First, fiscal discipline is crucial. Most crises in the region have been associated to 
fiscal imbalances. Moreover, countries that were able to recover strongly from their 
difficulties—like Chile in 1982 and Mexico in 1994, and also as in most Asian countries in 
1997-98—were those that had a strong fiscal position before the crisis hit. Despite some 
mild deterioration occurred in the fiscal position in the eve of these crises, there is no 
evidence that expansionary fiscal policy was central to the recovery (Céspedes and De 
Gregorio, 2005). Therefore, although not only countries with a weak fiscal position are 
exposed to a crisis, those that have solid public finances recover sooner. 
Regarding inflation, a low rate indicates credible monetary policy and sound 
monetary institutions. Rather than discussing details on monetary policy, stable low 
inflation is a summary statistic for good macroeconomic environment, which also is the 
basis for strong institutions at the macro level. Not only is it desirable to have an 
independent central bank, but it is also necessary to implement good policies. For example, 
a stable macroeconomic environment allows implementing a flexible exchange rate regime 
and using monetary policy as the instrument for stabilization, which becomes the most 
effective way for achieving macroeconomic stability. 
Perhaps the Achilles heel during crises in emerging markets is their weak financial 
sectors. Liability dollarization, mismatched currencies and maturities, implicit guarantees 
and related lending are among the factors that lead to financial crisis when there are 
significant corrections in relative prices or a curtailment of capital inflows. Prudential   15
regulation and strong institutions are important to take full advantage of financial 
development. Contrary to trade opening, financial liberalization can be the source of 
problems in a weak institutional setup. The Chilean economy learned this lesson the hard 
way, with a huge financial crisis in the early eighties. 
One of the most relevant vulnerabilities of financial systems is dollarization.  It 
happens when trust in the domestic currency is lost. This, in general, is the result of rising 
inflation and sudden and sharp devaluations. Dollarization is many times irreversible. 
Hence, after the economy stabilizes, and the value of the currency too, the de-dollarization 
process may never take place. Chile went a different route, minimizing the risk of 
permanent dollarization. After the 1982 crisis, instead of going into the dollar, most 
financial contracts were linked to the indexed currency (on a daily basis to the last month’s 
CPI) known as the UF (unidad de fomento). Deposits and loans denominated in UFs in the 
banking system increased significantly.
15 As the inflation rate declined, the economy has 
actually “de-UFized”, and currently the peso is the main unit to denominate financial 
contracts. This has been achieved in part by the policy decision to base monetary policy on 
a nominal interest rate. The composition of public debt has shifted from UFs to pesos. 
Therefore, financial indexation helped in the transition, but is no panacea. The unit in 
which contracts are written is not the only relevant consideration for avoiding dollarization; 
it is also the ability to enforce and honor financial contracts. The dollar is always a superior 
instrument when the enforcement of contracts is weak. 
Currency crises are costly. Empirical estimations indicate that a country that suffers 
a currency crisis has a cost of about 8% in terms of lost GDP, but this cost is doubled when 
accompanied by a banking crisis (De Gregorio and Lee, 2004). Of course these are 
averages across countries, and there are many examples in the region where the costs have 
been much higher. 
A much debated proposal to avoid crises is capital controls. An example of 
successful capital controls is the Chilean experience during the nineties. Chile was, after all, 
the country that suffered the least with the crisis of emerging markets toward the end of the 
last decade. In my view, capital controls did not introduce severe costs to the Chilean 
economy, but they were far from responsible of the success of the nineties. Capital controls 
                                                 
15 See Herrera and Valdés (2004) for further details.   16
did not prevent contagion from the Asian crisis and did not avoid the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate during the decade. They were quite ineffective. Their main effect was to 
tilt loan maturity from short-term to long-term, which seems a good thing, but the orders of 
magnitude involved in this shift were fairly small. Moreover, what was at the center of the 
recession in 1999 and also part the massive inflows in the nineties were the rigidities of the 
exchange rate. In recent years, the economy has been able to absorb a very volatile 
international environment with a flexible exchange rate and without capital controls. It is 
true that today the Chilean economy is not booming, as it was in the past with an 
international environment similar to the current one, but it is better prepared to face adverse 
external conditions. Prudent fiscal policy, based on a rule for the cyclically adjusted budget 
deficit, and a flexible exchange rate as part of an inflation target regime for monetary 
policy, provide more resilience to the Chilean economy to face external shocks.
16  
Perhaps, one of the most persuasive demonstrations that capital controls were not 
central to Chile’s success was that, in 1982, Chile had stricter capital controls than in the 
late 1990s.  Borrowing for less than two years was not allowed, and a reserve requirement 
(encaje) was in place for all remaining borrowing up to 65 months.  Furthermore, the 
banking sector was fully currency-matched in its assets and liabilities.  The crisis struck 
hardest in the corporate sector that was severely mismatched.  A large proportion of loans 
in foreign currency was lent to non-tradables sectors.  The lack of adequate financial 
regulation governing related lending, and a fixed-exchange-rate regime that provided 
insurance to those that borrowed abroad, were the key factors explaining the depth of the 
Chilean currency-financial crisis of 1982, and capital controls did not shield the economy 
from this. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Chilean case, capital controls have been used as a 
substitute for sound financial policies in many countries. Authorities may think—wrongly, 
of course—that instead of undertaking serious and necessary adjustments in the fiscal and 
financial fronts, they can get away with overspending by imposing capital controls. They 
give the wrong impression that the economy is well sheltered to face external shocks, and 
                                                 
16 Cowan and De Gregorio (2005), analyzing the effects of capital controls, argue that the key to explain 
capital inflows, financial vulnerability and currency crises is the exchange rate regime in place, rather than 
capital controls.   17
delay necessary reforms to strengthen macroeconomic institutions. Macroeconomic 
institutions were the pillars of the Chilean economic success, not capital controls. 
 
6.  Inequality, Distortions and Growth 
 
One of the most notorious characteristics of Latin American countries is their high level of 
inequality (figure 5). Indeed, it is possible to attribute most of the region’s economic 
problems to the severe disparities in income distribution.  But, as I will also discuss below, 
the case of Chile, with inequality at the same levels as some of its neighbors, has been able 
to overcome its distortions. 
Theoretical as well as empirical evidence suggests that unequal income distribution 
is bad for growth, although some recent research has challenged this view. The theoretical 
literature emphasizes that inequality can lead to inefficient policies that actually harm 
growth, in an attempt to compensate for severe inequality. The classic case is the 
introduction of inefficient taxation for purposes of redistribution.  However, there are more 
channels through which inequality hampers economic growth due to its impact on the 
quality of economic policy provoked by social conflicts.  Indeed, when including inequality 
in the cross-section regression presented in section 2, this variable lacks significance.  De 
Gregorio and Lee (2004) show that inequality deteriorates the factors and policies that 
foster growth. 
After adjusting for the level of development, countries with more unequal income 
distributions, as measured by the Gini coefficient, are more likely to have characteristics 
and policies that are bad for growth. For example, they have lower school enrollment rates, 
probably because, after controlling for average income, a larger fraction of their population 
cannot afford to go to school. In addition, countries with greater inequality have higher 
fertility rates, larger governments, lower educational attainment, and weaker institutions. 
Two issues are relevant in this discussion. The first one is defining the policy 
implications to reducing inequality. We know little about policies that can reduce inequality 
of income in a short period of time. Income distribution changes very slowly and we do not 
know about its main determinants. The relationship with income is unclear. Education   18
helps;
17 increasing educational achievement for the underprivileged reduces inequality, but 
it takes a long time to affect income distribution. Improving education today will have 
effects on income distribution many years later, when more educated people become a 
significant part of the labor force. This should not discourage educational reform, however, 
since it has an immediate effect on income mobility and the intertemporal distribution of 
income. Therefore, it contributes to equalize opportunities faster than it affects actual 
income. Welfare is more equally distributed when poor families find their kids receiving a 
better education. 
A second issue that is also very relevant in economies with high inequality is how to 
avoid its negative effects on policies and, through them, on economic growth. It is a very 
different thing to endure a stable unequal income distribution in a country that is 
experiencing growth from suffering inequality in another where the economy is stagnant. In 
addition, although growth may have small effects on inequality, growth is essential for 
poverty alleviation. Having good social policies, which can partly compensate for 
inequalities and are growth-enhancing, must be a priority. Strengthening institutions is 
particularly necessary in countries where inequality may be the source of corruption and 
other institutional distortions.  
The case of Chile is a good example. Despite its large inequality, its institutions or 
policies do not seem to have deteriorated, and the economy has been able to grow, which in 
turn have been key to reducing social conflict and focusing policies on growth and helping 
the poor.  Perhaps, fast growth has been the most important factor alleviating tensions from 
inequality, and lending broad support to economic policies since the 1990s. It has also 
improved the living conditions of the whole population.  Broadly speaking, income 
distribution has been roughly constant since 1990, and hence the whole population has seen 
its income increased at the rate of aggregate per-capita growth.  
In addition, as mentioned above, countries with pronounced inequality have worse 
economic conditions to foster growth.  In the case of Chile, these factors have been offset 
by policies. Indeed, the levels of respect for rule of law and secondary school enrollment 
                                                 
17 There are recent studies on the determinants of income distribution, where education appears to be an 
important factor in reducing inequality. However, as argued in the text, it takes time to turn around inequality 
via education. Other recent papers have emphasized the role of financial development in reducing inequality. 
See Li et al. (1998) and Beck et al. (2004).   19
are greater than would be predicted by Chile’s levels of inequality and income.  Similarly, 
the fertility rate is lower than what would be predicted by income and inequality.   
Therefore, Chile has been able to overcome, through institutions and public policy, the 
growth problems that tend to come with inequality. 
  Since distribution changes slowly and there are no clear prescriptions to alter it in 
the short run, one may wonder what can be done to avoid the noxious effects of inequality 
on policies.  The clearest instrument policymakers have at their disposal is fiscal policy, in 
particular the allocation of public spending.  We can take a closer look at inequality in 
Latin America and the role of fiscal policy using the data in de Ferranti et al. (2003), which 
include information on the provision of government spending across income quintiles.   
Figure 6 shows the distribution among deciles of transfers excluding social security (de 
Ferranti et al., 2003).  The figure shows that, in the sample of countries in the table, Chile is 
the only one where the largest fractions are allocated to the poorest (quintil 1).  Since these 
transfers are about 1% of GDP, a relatively small amount of total government expenditure, 
it is important to look at other components of government expenditure, especially education 
and health.  
Figure 7 shows income distribution measured by the Gini coefficient, represented 
by the dots (right scale).  In addition, using these data, for the year indicated in parenthesis, 
I present in the left scale the average gross national income per capita of the country and 
the average gross national income for the first quintile, using data on income for 2003.  The 
countries are presented from the highest income of the first quintile to the lowest quintile.  
We see a high correlation between income and income of the poorest.  This implies that, for 
most of the countries, the income of the poor is largest in the countries with the largest level 
of income per capita.  Gini coefficients are very volatile, but the relevant range for Latin 
America cannot by itself change significantly the overall ranking of income and the ranking 
of the first quintile.  The notable exceptions are the most egalitarian countries in the region: 
Costa Rica and Uruguay. Despite not having the highest income, the income of the poorest 
is the highest in the region.
18   
                                                 
18 Note that data on income distribution of Argentina and Uruguay are taken a year before the sharp crisis they 
had with the collapse of convertibility in late 2001.   20
  Although I already showed evidence on the distribution of transfers, and highlighted 
the importance of focalizing these expenditures on the poor, the expenditure allocated to the 
poor is much larger than transfers.  Indeed, although transfers are the more direct form of 
getting to the poor, its weight is low in total social expenditure. I use World Bank data to 
compute, in the same sample of Latin American countries of figure 7, the impact in 
reducing inequality of social expenditure once allocated.  In particular, I use the distribution 
of education and health expenditure and add to gross national income to compute the new 
Gini coefficients.  These computations are presented in figure 8. As a guide, the right axis 
depicts the Gini per capita of the first quintile.  For all the countries the Gini coefficient 
declines, and therefore, as expected, inequality declines as a result of social expenditure.  
Fiscal policy plays an important role in reducing income inequality at the expenditure level. 
  The reduction in the Gini coefficient and the differences across countries presented 
in figure 8 are the combined result of two factors.  The first is the level of education and 
health expenditure, and the second is the form in which these expenditures are allocated 
across different income brackets.  This decomposition is presented in figure 9.  The two 
columns of the figure show the percentage change in the Gini coefficient as a result of 
government expenditure (based on data in figure 8) and the other is the level of education 
and health expenditure as percentage of GDP.  The largest level of social expenditure as 
percentage of GDP is in Colombia, where the decline in the Gini is the largest.  Using these 
data, we can compute the efficiency of social expenditure in terms of the changes in the 
Gini per unit of social expenditure.  This is presented as dots in the figure and measured in 
the right axis of figure 9.  This measure is constructed by dividing the percentage change in 
the Gini by the level of government expenditure.  Chile and El Salvador are the countries 
with the most efficient social expenditure from the point of view of reducing inequality, but 
their social expenditure is relatively low.
19 This evidence suggests that as social 
expenditure increases, its focalization declines, as illustrated by the contrast between Chile 
and El Salvador with Colombia and Costa Rica.  Therefore, according to these figures, 
there are limits to the efficacy with which social expenditure can improve income 
distribution. 
                                                 
19 These figures are illustrative and present broad trends, but always there are measurement problems, first 
due to the traditional problem of coverage, which is different across countries, and second due to the forms in 
which expenditure is made.     21
  Summing up, Latin America has very unequal distribution and this is an important 
handicap for growth.  Social fragmentation deteriorates the quality of economic policies 
and reduces growth potential.  High levels of inequality tend to induce policies that can 
generate significant distortions and hamper economic growth.  The search for reducing 
inequality may induce inefficiencies.  Classical cases are minimum wages and labor market 
regulations. A more effective and direct way to ameliorate the problems inequality 
generates is through social expenditure, which contributes to providing income to the poor.  
However, as illustrated here, the effectiveness of social expenditure has also limits.  In 
addition, there are issues such as financing of the budget that may tilt the balance enough to 
introduce distortions because of inability to obtain all the required revenues.  Finally, 
having good institutional and policy frameworks are important in order for policies for the 
poor to succeed.  
 
7.  On Growth Fundamentals: Institutions, Competition and Mobility 
 
We could list many areas where improvement is possible and would foster growth. But 
ultimately the question one would like to have answered is, What are the main foundations 
that support the accumulation of human and physical capital and improvements in 
productivity—in short, that determine economic growth? Growth occurs when incentives 
are appropriately in place to make people and firms spend their talents in growth enhancing 
activities, as opposed, for example, to rent seeking or political capture. In my view, two 
basic principles underlie growth: 
•  Secure property rights. When people invest in their own human capital, or when 
entrepreneurs invest in plant and equipment or in new techniques to increase 
productivity, they must be certain that the benefits of these investments will not be 
taken away from them. For this to happen, property rights need to be clearly defined 
and respected. 
•  Adequate structure of rewards. Investment and effort must be properly rewarded. 
This is essential to encourage creativity, entrepreneurship, and a growth-promoting 
allocation of talent.   22
In terms of policy, securing property rights implies setting clear rules of the game. It 
is inevitable that some policies, or changes in policies, will have redistributive effects. 
Modifying tax policies, for example, changes the profitability of investment in physical and 
human capital, in effect reducing or increasing the value of that capital. Improving 
regulation, too, often changes profitability. A firm that has become a monopoly may be 
obliged to take steps to reduce its monopolistic power and cut down its profits. In short, 
redistribution happens. In other cases, property rights are not clearly defined.  This is 
typical of environmental conflicts, for example between the agricultural sector and 
industrial development that causes pollution.  Property rights have their limits and there are 
conflicts as well as gray areas. The important thing is to be clear on those limits and the 
mechanisms to resolve disputes. To achieve this, nations must have strong institutions and 
clear rules to define and delimit property rights, as well as mechanisms for fair 
compensation when changes in policy have redistributive effects. 
In a democracy, taxes are generally decided upon by the legislature, and no one 
should be surprised, although some may not like it, when changes in taxes occur. Of course, 
a sound constitution and good laws will prevent arbitrary enforcement of the tax laws and 
outright expropriation. The lesson here is again on the need to have strong institutions, and 
these institutions must have a clear orientation toward protecting property rights. 
A stable macroeconomic environment is also an important part of securing property 
rights. High and unstable inflation also redistributes income, usually from savers to 
borrowers, and this discourages saving. By, in effect, liquidating nominal public debt 
through sharp price increases, inflation also redistributes wealth from bondholders to 
governments. The same can be said of freezes on deposits during banking crises, and other 
confiscatory policies. Macroeconomic stability thus promotes growth by providing a safe 
environment in which to invest, allowing entrepreneurs to focus on the usual and 
unavoidable risks of business, rather than protecting themselves from macroeconomic 
instability. 
But the second principle—an adequate reward structure—is also important and 
necessary for growth. One can imagine a country where property rights are secure and 
immutable but the business sector consists of a group of monopolists enjoying significant 
barriers to entry. No one will then have any incentive to invest or to compete: the   23
established monopolists have no need to do so, and any potential new entrant will 
encounter clear disadvantages. Therefore, it is not enough to protect property rights, 
although necessary.  The means to establish this second principle in the economic arena is 
competition, full and strong competition, that allows markets to operate efficiently. 
Openness and free trade, in turn, are essential to ensure and increase competition, especially 
in a small economy. In order to compete and succeed, firms will need to operate efficiently 
and creatively. Absent any competitive threat to established business, there will be no 
incentive for these businesses to be efficient. 
Regulating and fostering competition has implications regarding the protection of 
property rights and also providing adequate rewards to effort and entrepreneurship. Many 
countries are discussing regulatory reforms to spur growth, and this is good. But, in my 
view, the most important institutional basis is to define how conflicts are resolved, who is 
responsible for setting regulations, and who is charged with administering those 
regulations. Granting independence to and requiring accountability from regulators, and 
defining independent panels to settle disputes (including interpretation of the law) are the 
most important reform that ensuring stability and fair rules of the game may provide for 
encouraging investment and productivity. However, it is important to foster accountability, 
which is particularly necessary for independent institutions.  
The second principle also has implications for social policy. It is important that 
workers, as well as businesses, receive rewards appropriate to their effort. A natural 
aspiration of parents, especially among the poor, is that their children enjoy more 
prosperous lives than their own. For this they need opportunities. A person’s income from 
labor will depend on the productivity of that labor, and so the goal of educational policy 
must be to transfer useful knowledge and thus transform people into more productive 
workers. Stated more generally, this second principle translates into social mobility, or 
equal opportunity, on the social front. 
We can better understand difficulties in Latin America in the light of these two 
principles. In many LAC, institutions are weak, the macroeconomic environment is 
unstable, and therefore property rights are not properly safeguarded. In addition, trade is 
still very low, and hence the scope for competition is limited. Therefore, investors are not 
always well rewarded. On the other hand, the quality of education must be improved, and   24
efforts to reduce inequality through social policies aimed at improving the living conditions 
of the poor and creating conditions for greater social mobility, must be reinforced. From the 
point of view of government activities, it is important to focus on how to foster growth and 
help the poor and the disadvantaged, while minimizing policy distortions. This is not a 
trivial challenge, but as long as growth can be sustained, the job is made easier, because 
populist temptations are then reduced, although never eliminated. 
 
8.  Final Remarks: The Mood, The Facts and The Prospects 
 
There is a lot of uncertainty and skepticism about Latin America’s prospects, and certainly 
those priors are well grounded on a history of deception, recurrent crisis, and inability to 
sustain economic progress.  Latin America has been perhaps the most fertile ground for 
proposing ideologies and “new” ways to face development, but they have not succeeded.  
On the other hand, there is also skepticism about whether reforms and the “Washington 
Consensus,” or some new incarnation of it, is the way to go.  I have argued that one size 
does not fit all, and not only the reform package, but also the timing, political legitimacy 
and delivery are critical.  However, there are some basic principles such as protecting 
property rights, encouraging competition and openness.  In this final section I want to 
summarize in my view which is the actual mood, what are the facts and what can we 
conclude about prospects for economic progress. 
 
The mood: 
The mood is gloomy.  There is uncertainty, and some deception.  Perhaps, the 1990s were 
good years for some, but they did not succeed.  For others, reforms were incomplete or 
plainly wrong, so no wonder the results.  The lack of results from reforms, together with 
much more political uncertainty today, turns out to pessimism.  Corruption scandals, not 
only the recent ones, but also past experiences, add to the pessimism, or at least skepticism.  
Recent macroeconomic crises have placed reforms, especially institutional and 
microeconomic ones, on the backburner.  However, I will argue that although there could 
be reasons for moderate skepticism, the region is in a position where it could (finally?) start 
sustainable growth.   25
 
The facts: 
Recent data, as well as short-term forecasts, on macroeconomic performance are presented 
in tables 5 and 6.  In terms of growth, the region has moved closer to world average.  But, 
on a time series basis, the region has done much better this decade than the previous one.  
Although the ten years up to 2002 experienced some crises that reduced average growth, 
since then Latin America, in general, has been recovering at a reasonable pace.  The largest 
economies, Brazil and Mexico, are below the simple regional average, and of course 
improving their performance should spill over to the rest of the region.  
  The chronic malaise, inflation, is historically low.  From the group of countries 
represented in table 5, only Argentina and Venezuela have two-digit inflation, something 
that was very common even until as recently as the nineties. This is a very important 
achievement, which could in part be due to the slack of economic activity, but any measure 
of output gap will not suffice to explain the large decline since the nineties, and more likely 
this is a durable achievement. On the external front, the data show that the region is not 
relying too heavily on foreign financing in this phase of the cycle. 
  Regarding fiscal performance, there has also been an improvement (table 6).  Some 
of this improved performance may be due to high commodity prices.  But, taking into 
account the fact that in general Latin American economies are not in a boom and that 
inflation is still contained, it is very likely that this improved performance is more structural 
than simply good conditions for high revenues.  Further evidence is shown in figure 10, 
which presents the evolution of the primary fiscal balance (PB) and the overall fiscal 
balance (OB) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the average of Latin American 
countries as reported by UBS.  Latin America has had an improvement between 2.5 and 3 
percentage points of GDP since 1998.  This is major progress and has been achieved in 
governments of different political signs.  
  Overall, at least on the macro front, Latin America is in good standing.  Whether 
this is the result of a good external environment and a favorable cyclical position is open to 
discussion.  However, progress on the fiscal side as well as in lowering inflation is 
indicative that the region has good initial conditions to resume growth, and the challenge is 
to consolidate stability.   26
  
The prospects: 
Being macroeconomically stable, having an open economy, developing institutions oriented 
to the protection of property rights and the rule of law, and good human resources, among 
others, are key to sustain growth.   One can add an array of caveats about timing, intensity, 
and deepness of reforms, but there are no shortcuts to basic principles.  However, inability 
to sustain growth in the region has been the result of failure to deliver. 
It is necessary to build support for reforms, assuring that their benefits reach all of 
the population.  Reforms and transformation have their costs, but they must at least be 
perceived as fair, and not as that those who bear the costs are always the same and those 
who enjoy the benefits are always the same minority too.  Policies that promote 
competition and openness bring better living conditions across the whole population. 
  As I have argued, the recent crises in emerging countries have brought better 
macroeconomic management.  It is essential to maintain it during good times and to 
increase the economies’ resilience to external shocks to be better prepared for bad times.  
All things being equal, the region will still grow modestly, so progress in reforms is 
necessary to speed up growth, and perhaps one primary factor to sustain reforms and 
growth is to build support for growth-oriented economic policies. I think in the successful 
case of Chile, despite large unsatisfied needs and deep inequalities, the benefits of growth 
have been widespread, and this has allowed building strong support for macroeconomic 
stability, market oriented reforms, and strong social policies. 
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Table 1: Latin America’s Growth in Per Capita GDP (%) 
    
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000  1970-2000
LATIN AMERICA     
Argentina  2.29 1.38 -3.87 4.22 1.00  0.57
Bolivia  0.60 2.01 -2.22 1.08 0.37  0.29
Brazil  4.23 5.67 -0.26 1.46 2.77  2.29
Chile  2.19 1.22 1.28 4.79 2.37  2.43
Colombia  2.23 3.11 1.35 0.87 1.89  1.78
Costa Rica  1.85 2.59 -0.94 1.75 1.31  1.13
Ecuador  1.35 6.16 -1.17 -0.85 1.37  1.38
El Salvador  2.24 0.05 -1.66 2.30 0.73  0.23
Guatemala  2.44 3.05 -1.21 0.84 1.28  0.90
Jamaica  3.43 -1.14 1.72 -1.05 0.74  -0.16
Mexico  3.28 3.27 -0.43 1.78 1.97  1.54
Nicaragua  3.25 -2.70 -3.00 -2.42 -1.22  -2.71
Panama  4.98 3.35 -0.69 1.96 2.40  1.54
Paraguay  1.70 4.46 1.01 -0.58 1.64  1.63
Peru  3.73 0.45 -3.13 2.47 0.88 -0.07
Uruguay  0.43 2.70 -1.00 2.81 1.23  1.50
Venezuela  2.95 -2.79 -1.36 -0.80 -0.50  -1.65
Average 2.05  1.56 -0.74 0.98 0.96  0.60
REFERENCE    
Japan  9.27 3.09 3.53 1.05 4.23  2.55
USA  2.87 2.66 2.16 2.30 2.50  2.37
East Asia (9)  4.69 5.36 4.45 3.95 4.61  4.58
World  2.53 1.99 0.98 1.32 1.70  1.43
Source: Heston, Summers and Atten (2002)   









   Table 2: LAC’s GDP Per Capita as Ratio of GDP Per Capita of the USA
1900 1913 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Argentina 0.67 0.72 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.28 0.30
Bolivia n.a. n.a. 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.09
Brazil 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.28 0.21 0.20
Colombia 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.18
Chile 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.35
Ecuador n.a. n.a. 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.11
Mexico 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.26
Paraguay n.a. n.a. 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.11
Peru 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.13
Uruguay 0.54 0.62 0.49 0.44 0.34 0.35 0.28 0.28
Venezuela 0.20 0.21 0.78 0.85 0.71 0.55 0.36 0.30
Latin America 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.22 0.22
East Asia (9)  0.16 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.33
Asian-4 n.a. 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.40  0.54 0.66
Source: Maddison (2001). 
n.a.: not available.   31
 
Table 3: Level Decomposition, GDP per-capita 2000
Per capita GDP Capital-Output Human Capital Productivity
Ratio
Argentina 0.398 0.921 0.943 0.458
[ 0.432 ] [ 0.422 ] [ 0.868 ]
Chile 0.389 0.863 0.694 0.649
[ 0.450 ] [ 0.560 ] [ 0.599 ]
Colombia 0.178 0.701 0.629 0.403
[ 0.254 ] [ 0.283 ] [ 0.441 ]
Mexico 0.381 0.922 0.684 0.604
[ 0.413 ] [ 0.557 ] [ 0.631 ]
Peru 0.156 1.006 0.695 0.224
[ 0.155 ] [ 0.225 ] [ 0.699 ]
Venezuela 0.275 0.936 0.666 0.441
[ 0.294 ] [ 0.413 ] [ 0.624 ]
Corea 0.571 1.185 0.977 0.493
[ 0.482 ] [ 0.584 ] [ 1.158 ]
Greece 0.546 1.127 0.940 0.515
[ 0.485 ] [ 0.581 ] [ 1.060 ]
Israel 0.675 1.114 0.955 0.634
[ 0.605 ] [ 0.706 ] [ 1.065 ]
Asia-4 0.670 1.089 0.885 0.724
[ 0.640 ] [ 0.788 ] [ 0.963 ]
Latin America 0.225 0.816 0.648 0.464
[ 0.301 ] [ 0.379 ] [ 0.529 ]
Each figure represents the ratio between that country or region with respect to the US.  The product of capital, 
human capital and producivity equals the output gap, except for averages.  The figures in square brackets are
the values that would take the ratio of income with respect to the US if that specific gap would be zero.























Argentina -1.5 -2.9 -1.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 -1.4 0.1 -0.1 -1.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5
Bolivia -1.8 -1.4 1.7 -0.3 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.3
Brazil 0.2 -3.2 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -2.0 -0.5 -0.1 -1.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7
Chile 0.3 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5
Colombia -0.3 -0.7 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.3
Mexico -0.6 -1.6 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5
Paraguay -0.5 -0.9 0.7 -0.2 -0.7 0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0
Peru -2.2 -1.3 0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.8 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.3
Uruguay -0.6 -2.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 0.5 -1.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5
Venezuela -3.8 -1.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2
Latin 21 Avg. -1.2 -1.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
World Avg.** 2.1 3.0
* Author's calculation.  Human resources include life expectancy variable.  
** The figures are actual and predicted growth, used to compute the differences reported for each country.
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Table 5: Recent Macroeconomic Indicators
GDP Growth (%) Inflation (%)               Current Account (% GDP)
1993-2002 2002-2006 (f) 2005 2006 (f) 1993-2002 2002-2006 (f) 2005 2006 (f) 1993-2002 2002-2006 (f) 2005 2006 (f)
World 3.5 4.4 4.8 4.9 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.3
  Argentina 0.7 4.7 9.2 7.3 4.2 13.2 9.6 12.9 -2.2 4.1 1.8 1.2
  Bolivia 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.1 6.1 3.5 5.4 3.4 -5.4 0.8 2.6 1.7
  Brazil 3.0 2.6 2.3 3.5 412.3 8.3 6.9 4.9 -2.9 0.8 1.8 1.0
  Chile 5.0 4.8 6.3 5.5 6.4 2.7 3.1 3.8 -2.7 -0.4 -0.4 0.5
  Colombia 2.4 4.0 5.1 4.5 15.9 5.8 5.0 4.7 -2.9 -1.4 -1.7 1.6
  Ecuador 2.2 3.8 3.3 3.0 38.4 5.8 2.4 3.4 -2.4 -1.7 -0.9 0.2
  El Salvador 3.9 2.4 2.8 3.5 6.4 3.7 4.0 4.0 -1.6 -3.8 -4.0 -4.0
  Guatemala 3.7 2.9 3.2 4.1 8.8 7.5 9.1 6.9 -5.0 -4.5 -4.5 -4.2
  Mexico 2.8 2.6 3.0 3.5 16.0 4.3 4.0 3.5 -3.1 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6
  Peru 4.4 5.1 6.7 5.0 12.0 2.1 1.6 2.7 -5.0 -0.2 1.3 1.4
  Uruguay 0.5 2.7 6.0 4.0 22.9 11.0 5.9 5.5 -1.5 -1.2 -2.4 -5.8
  Venezuela 0.1 3.3 9.3 6.0 41.9 20.6 15.9 11.7 3.8 13.5 19.1 14.1
Average 2.7 3.5 5.1 4.5 49.3 7.4 6.1 5.6 -2.6 0.4 1.0 0.6
(f): Forecast.

















Table 6: General Government Fiscal Balance
            Primary Balance            Overall Balance
1997-2002 2002-2005(f) 2005 (f) 1997-2002 2002-2005(f) 2005 (f)
Argentina 0.8 2.3 3.1 -2.0 0.3 1.0
Bolivia -3.5 -4.4 -2.3 -5.2 -7.0 -5.2
Brazil 2.3 3.6 3.9 -5.0 -5.8 -5.5
Chile (*) 0.9 1.5 2.3 0.0 0.5 1.3
Colombia -0.8 0.9 1.6 -4.6 -3.8 -3.4
Ecuador (*) 3.2 1.9 1.6 -1.6 -1.2 -1.3
El Salvador -1.2 0.4 1.2 -2.9 -3.3 -2.8
Guatemala (*) -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4
Mexico 1.8 1.4 1.6 -1.1 -0.9 -0.5
Peru 0.2 0.6 1.0 -2.0 -1.6 -1.1
Uruguay (*) -1.6 2.2 4.4 -4.2 -2.7 -0.4
Venezuela (*) 0.1 0.7 0.8 -2.0 -3.9 -3.7
Average 0.1 0.9 1.6 -2.7 -2.6 -1.9
(f): Forecast.
(*): Central government.
Source: Moody's  36
Figure 1: Latin America's Relative Per Capita GDP (%)
(a) Simple Average
(b) GDP-Weighted Average 
   Source: Maddison (1995) and Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).  For data description see
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Source: World development indicators, Department of Statistics of Taiwan, Singapore Statistics. All figures are
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LAT OB LAT OB ARG PB ARG OB BRA PB
BRA OB CHI PB CHI OB MEX PB MEX OB
Source: UBS, November 2005. OB is overall balance and PB is primary 
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